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Nowadays, and as always, the tax burden imposed by the governments is a crucial
discussion topic. In fact, there is a constant tension between the non-appropriation of in-
dividuals’ income and wealth, through taxation, and, at the same time, the need to finance
public expenditure. That tension probably arises from a micro-macroeconomics duality
problem. Indeed, there is a microeconomic perspective that taxation is a subtraction of
income obtained by individual efforts, both for households and firms, which is true in a
static perspective of reality, but it is neglected from the macroeconomic circuit.
However, in a macroeconomic framework, the income and wealth levied from the eco-
nomic private sector are redistributed and allocated through public spending. Indepen-
dently of the productive or unproductive features of government expenditures, the money
is not taken out of the economy. It is, in fact, put into circulation boosting several aspects
of an economy through both public consumption and investment. Consequently, there is
a need to understand the truly effects of taxation on real economic growth. Yet, and as a
criticism, when David Ricardo claims that taxation always presents a counter-productive
factor for economic development (Ricardo (2005)), we believe he is only taking part in the
microeconomic outlook, and not in the macroeconomic overview, which is representative
of a dynamic and circular economy, regardless of the development stage.
Therefore, and to give new insights, in this study we try to find both linear and non-
linear tax items-economic growth relationships, for the 1980-2015 period. In this empirical
assessment, we intend to evaluate possible inefficient characteristics of the power to tax.
Despite of some founds about linear connections between taxation and economic growth,
we also find concave relationships between those economic phenomena. More specifically,
we reach few tax-growth thresholds values elucidating the possible positive effects of the
coercion power of the governments, i.e, we found optimal values of taxation that boosts
economic growth, both in a short and a long-term perspective, contrarily to the mainstream
speeches verified nowadays.
The remaining of this empirical research is organised as follows: section 2 provides a
literature review of the related theoretical viewpoints and empirical studies on this topic;
section 3 presents the methodology, the data and its sources; section 4 highlights the
empirical results; and section 5 summarizes our conclusions.
2 Literature Review
Several literature addresses the linkage between government revenues and, more specifi-
cally the tax composition and economic growth, both in short and long-term. In particular,
Kneller et al. (1999) through an empirical analysis including 22 OECD countries for 26
years timespan, found that, contrarily to non-distortionary taxation, distortionary taxes
hamper economic growth. The same conclusion is reached by Bleaney et al. (2001). In fact,
these authors investigate the endogenous growth model proposition, considering that gov-
ernment spending and taxation have both temporary and permanent effects on economic
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performance. The authors’ analysis was conducted for the years between 1970 and 1995 for
OECD countries. Regarding taxation effects on growth, it is found that non-distortionary
taxes have a positive impact on growth, while distortionary taxes present an opposite ef-
fect. The negative distortionary taxation impact on growth is also found in an analysis
performed by Gemmell et al. (2007), on the period between 1970 and 2004 for OECD
countries conducted; Fölster and Henrekson (2001) evaluate the growth-tax linkage in the
1970-1995 period for a sub-sample of OECD countries, and found a non-significant effect of
taxation on growth. The authors’ conclusions are also robust under extreme bound anal-
yses. However, considering other geographies as Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, the
conclusions evidence a negative significant impact on economic performance by taxation.
Afonso and Furceri (2010) report that indirect tax revenues present negative and sig-
nificant effects on growth for both EU and OECD countries between 1970 and 2004, while
direct taxes show no impact on economic performance, evidencing a lesser degree of distor-
tion when compared to indirect taxes. Yet, the authors do not find a concave relationship
between taxes and growth.
Furthermore, a similar result is achieved in Karras and Furceri (2009). The author
addresses the tax-growth relation for 19 European countries and during a 39 years period
(1965-2003). While it is found that taxes present a negative impact between 0.5% and 1%
for a percentage point increase in the overall taxation, consumption taxes seem to be the
most detrimental source of taxation for growth. In addition, a similar result is reached by
Zimč́ık (2016), who concludes that non-distortionary taxes, as production taxes, show a
detrimental effect on growth. Still, Arnold et al. (2011) examine the tax policy changes
needed for a sustainable transition from the short to the long-term economic growth, while
a sample of 21 OECD countries for the 1971-2004 period, and founds that growth can be
promoted by a progressive increasing towards consumption and property taxation, with a
consequent income taxation reduction.
Angelopoulos et al. (2007) develop a competitive decentralized equilibrium model to
study the growth-government revenues nexus, among other relationships, evaluating their
model for 23 OECD countries, and for 5-year periods between 1970 and 2000. The authors’
conclusion is that capital and corporate income tax rates are positively related to growth.
On the other hand, some studies report a different result. More specifically, Cashin (1995)
concludes for a negative impact on growth by distortionary taxation. For the period
between 1970 and 2012, Afonso and Alves (2015), in order to determine debt thresholds,
find that capital and profits taxation are detrimental for growth. This result is corroborated
by Arnold (2008), which assesses how tax structures influence growth dynamics for 21
OECD countries between 1971 and 2004. The author concludes that, besides the fact that
income taxes, in particular, the ones on firms, are detrimental for growth, the priority
should be to tax the property and consumption, since those taxation sources are growth
enhancing. In line with the two previous studies, Benos (2009), through an analysis with a
14 EU countries’ sample between 1990 and 2006, found that distortionary taxation, where
capital, income and wealth taxation are included, has a negative impact on economic
growth rates. Yet, and in line with these conclusions, Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012)
found that changing the tax composition in favour of income taxes is negatively related
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with long-term growth rates. This effect is even clear for social security contributions
and personal income taxes. Contrarily, the results achieved highlight that it is preferable
to shift taxation from income to property taxes rather than to change from income to
consumption taxation.
Tosun and Abizadeh (2005) evaluate the tax structure and its effects on growth. The
analysis conducted for 24 OECD countries between 1980 and 1999 highlights that personal
and property taxes are the tax items, which more respond (positively) to a change in per
capita GDP, while taxes on payroll, and on goods and services decrease their importance.
In addition, and by decomposing the tax revenues into several tax components for 155
countries during a 39 years period, Afonso and Jalles (2014) evidence a non-significant
effect of each tax component on growth.
De Witte and Moesen (2010) resort to a non-parametric data envelopment analysis
to assess a concave relationship between growth and government size, with a sample of
23 OECD countries. The authors computed a 42% value, on average, for an economic
optimality for tax burden. Lastly, the study conducted in Xing (2012), by assessing the
tax revenues composition and the per capita growth found that several empirical articles
regarding tax-economic growth topic present a non-robust econometric results under dif-
ferent heterogeneity hypothesis across the articles’ countries sample, both for short and
long term.
3 Methodology and Data
In our analysis we consider an aggregate production function of the type Y = F (T ),
i.e., the economic output is a function of the structure of taxation represented generically
by the set T .




n,i,t+νi+ηt+εi,t, j = 1, 2, t = 1, ..., T, i = 1, ..., N (1)
where gi,t is the real per capita GDP growth rate, yi,t−1 is the one-lag real per capita GDP,
τt represents each tax item, in GDP term, x
j
i,t is an independent variable belonging to
the first or second sets of control variables j, νi and ηt are the country and time-specific
effects, respectively, εi,t represents an unobserved zero mean white noise-type column vector
satisfying the standard assumptions, and lastly, the βn,i,t are the coefficients that will be
estimated to assess the impact of each variable on growth.
We then add an additional squared term for each tax item to assess possible non-
linearity effects of tax items on economic performance, as expressed in the following equa-
tion








i,t +νi +ηt +εi,t, t = 1, ..., T, i = 1, ..., N
(2)
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Each tax item threshold is computed by equalizing equation (3) to zero as shown in
equation (4),




Consequently, if the results evidence a significant negative signal for β2,i,t, it means that
there is a concave relationship between a tax item and economic performance, implying a
maximum value of taxation raised in an economy that promote economic growth. On the
contrary, a positive significant coefficient leads to an inverse conclusion. A positive β2,i,t
means a convex relationship translating, in an economic sense, into a tax item value that
minimizes economic growth. Hence, in the results section, when we get convex relations
we will highlight those coefficient to differentiate between maximum and minimum optimal
levels.
The model is estimated for the period between 1980 and 2015 and for the following
OECD countries: Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Chile
(CHL), Czech Republic (CZE), Denmark (DNK), Estonia (EST), Finland (FIN), France
(FRA), Germany (DEU), Greece (GRC), Hungary (HUN), Iceland (ISL), Ireland (IRL),
Israel (ISR), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), South Korea (KOR), Latvia (LVA), Luxembourg
(LUX), Mexico (MEX), the Netherlands (NLD), New Zealand (NZL), Norway (NOR),
Poland (POL), Portugal (PRT), Slovak Republic (SVK), Slovenia (SVN), Spain (ESP),
Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (CHE), Turkey (TUR), United Kingdom (GBR) and United
States (USA).
Our database consisted in several data sources. The GDP is based on purchasing-
power-parity per capita GDP (realgdppc), in thousands, and the respective growth rate
(realgdppcgr), the general government structural balance in percentage of GDP (capb), the
general government gross debt-to-GDP ratio (debt), and the share of total government
expenditures in percentage of GDP (totexp) are from World Economic Outlook, from the
International Monetary Fund; taxes on income, profits and capital gains of individuals
(taxinc), taxes on income, profits and capital gains of corporates (taxfirms), social secu-
rity contributions (ssc), taxes on payroll and workforce (taxpayroll), taxes on property
(taxprop), taxes on goods and services (taxvat), gross fixed capital formation growth rate
(gfcfgr), current account balance in percentage of GDP (current), long-term interest rates
(ltir), average hours actually worked (avg), and unemployment rate in percentage of active
population (unem) are based on OECD.Stats database.
From the Government Finance Statistics we used data of public spending, based on
classification of the functions of government, i.e., government expenditures on general
public services (pubser), on defense (def ), on public order & safety (pubor), on economic
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affairs (eco), on environment protection (env), on housing & community amenities (hou),
on health (hea), on recreation, culture, & religion (cul), on education (edu), and on social
protection (socpro).
In addition, the data on old age dependency ratio as percentage of active population
(ageratioold), total fertility rate (fertility), GDP percentage of household final consumption
expenditure (hconsggdp), land area in squared km (landarea), and total life expectancy at
birth in years (lexpectancy) are from the World Development Indicators (WDI).
Lastly, population in millions (pop) and the total factor productivity at constant na-
tional prices (rtfpna) are based in Feenstra et al. (2015), while liquid liabilities-to-GDP
ratio (llgdp) is based on International Financial Statistics (IFS) data from the International
Monetary Fund. The table 1 presents the summary statistics for each variable used in our
econometric specifications1.
To estimate the coefficients, we apply panel data techniques by using OLS, OLS-Fixed
Effects (FE), Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and Robust Least Squares (RLS).
With the exception of RLS, we estimate the coefficient resorting to white diagonal covari-
ance matrix assumption, in order to assume a residual heterokedasticity. In addition to the
use of each tax component as mentioned above, we used two set of control variables: in the
first econometric specification we include as the set of control variables realgdppc−1, gfcfgr,
current, ltir, avg, unem, capb, debt and totexp variables; in the second specification, we
include the variables realgdppc−1, pubser, def, pubor, eco, env, hou, hea, cul, edu, socpro,
llgdp, lpop, rtfpna, ageratioold, fertility, hconsggdp, landarea, and lexpectancy variables.
Furthermore, we estimate both equations (1) and (2) for an annual growth rate as well as
for a 5-years average economic growth. Yet, it is important to mention that we will only
assess possible tax thresholds for each tax item when we obtain both statistical coefficients
for both linear and square term items regressors, with significant level of at least 10%.
Table 1: Summary statistics of the variables set for economic growth regressions, 1980-2015.
realgdppc taxinc taxfirms ssc taxpayroll taxprop taxvat
Mean 24.448 8.820 2.806 8.345 0.369 1.745 10.588
Std dev 14.313 4.635 1.500 4.981 0.728 1.003 3.046
Max 101.054 26.780 12.594 19.173 5.661 7.334 18.730
Min 2.184 0.873 0.261 0.000 0.000 0.074 2.979
Obs. 1195 1106 1106 1137 1137 1137 1137
gfcfgr current ltir avg unem capb debt
Mean 3.314 -0.578 6.211 1797.237 7.349 -2.588 55.728
Std dev 8.917 5.565 3.429 249.343 3.835 3.295 35.901
Max 45.119 16.467 22.498 2911.000 27.467 6.003 242.113
Min -47.761 -23.201 -0.069 1361.700 1.854 -18.676 3.664
Obs. 1164 727 854 986 741 860 943
totexp pubser def pubor eco env hou
Mean 42.621 6.703 1.681 1.698 4.760 0.689 0.756
Std dev 9.657 2.274 1.333 0.440 1.763 0.346 0.440
Max 68.436 16.701 8.851 3.761 25.280 1.758 5.411
1For reasons of parsimony, the results of realgdppc and landarea variables are expressed in thousands
of USD and squared km, respectively.
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Min 14.244 2.980 0.000 0.815 1.307 -0.284 -0.083
Obs. 977 585 586 585 585 583 585
hea cul edu socpro llgdp pop rtfpna
Mean 5.901 1.176 5.394 15.562 72.910 33.531 0.941
Std dev 1.686 0.570 1.080 4.708 48.689 52.235 0.123
Max 9.123 3.630 8.116 26.180 399.114 319.449 1.539
Min 0.379 0.248 3.021 5.440 6.865 0.228 0.472
Obs. 585 585 585 585 1139 1173 1173
ageratioold fertility hconsggdp landarea lexpectancy
Mean 20.094 1.793 56.382 1014985.867 76.316
Std dev 5.519 0.499 7.069 2412039.914 3.934
Max 42.653 4.836 79.551 9161920.000 83.844
Min 6.641 1.076 29.918 2590.000 58.692
Obs. 1260 1260 1174 1220 1260
4 Results
4.1 Short-run effects of taxation on economic growth
For both econometric specifications, as addressed in the previous section, equations (1)
to (8) are based on the first set of control variables, while the equations (9) to (16) are
based on second set.
When the first set of control variables is used, the results presented in table 2 show
that there is always a β-convergence process, through the negative and significant signal
evidenced for the real per capita GDP. In addition, the growth of investment (gfcfgr) and
the long-term interest rates evidence an expected signal for the economic growth dynamics,
when their coefficients are statistically significant. On other hand, the government expen-
ditures seem to be detrimental to growth, which is consistent to Afonso and Jalles (2016)
findings. However, at the same time, the structural budget balance and the government
debt-to-GDP ratio appear to present an expected negative relationship to economic growth
(see for e.g. the conclusions presented in Afonso and Alves (2015)).
Looking in detail for the tax components effects on economic performance, and for the
equations without the square term (equations (1), (3), (5) and (7)), we can conclude that
only taxation of individual income, in proportion of GDP, presents a positive effect on
growth. The other tax items evidence a consistent relationship. In fact, the econometric
regressions highlight some positive, and other negative, tax effects on GDP, depending on
the econometric technique under analysis.
Additionally, and when we study the possible non-linear relationships between tax-
to-GDP items and their impact on growth (equations (2), (4), (6) and (8)), we verify
some tax thresholds. Namely, we reach to the conclusion that there is an average value
of 5.82%, which represents the maximum proportion of taxation that should be levied on
firms’ income. The same conclusion is found for taxes on payroll and workforce, when
we reach to an average maximum of 1.86% proportion of GDP from this tax item. In
addition, we reach to an average value of 11.37% of social security contributions maximum
in percentage of GDP (equations (2), (6) and (8)). On the other hand, we also compute
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a minimum value of 17.15%, meaning that raising social security revenues until that value
will lower the economic growth rates.
Table 2: Linear and non-linear short-run impact results of taxation structure on economic
growth dynamics for equation (1).
OLS OLS-FE GMM RLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
realgdppc−1 -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
taxinc 0.097 0.037 -0.017 0.221 -0.008 -0.176 0.159*** 0.134*
(0.063) (0.122) (0.146) (0.250) (0.077) (0.165) (0.043) (0.081)
taxinc2 0.004 -0.012 0.007 0.003
(0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.003)
taxfirms 0.063 0.557*** -0.337** 0.318 -0.010 0.173 0.085 0.631***
(0.080) (0.200) (0.163) (0.312) (0.087) (0.315) (0.06) (0.170)
taxfirms2 -0.050*** -0.058*** -0.016 -0.052***
(0.017) (0.020) (0.029) (0.015)
ssc 0.173*** 0.655*** -0.903*** -2.950** 0.095 0.525*** 0.241*** 0.647***
(0.059) (0.108) (0.205) (1.258) (0.064) (0.124) (0.036) (0.082)
ssc2 -0.03*** 0.086* -0.027*** -0.024***
(0.006) (0.052) (0.006) (0.005)
taxpayroll 0.042 1.006*** -0.711** 0.496 -0.052 0.587 0.111 0.974***
(0.118) (0.276) (0.356) (0.540) (0.127) (0.382) (0.103) (0.270)
taxpayroll2 -0.283*** -0.266*** -0.157 -0.252***
(0.076) (0.096) (0.105) (0.081)
taxprop 0.103 0.111 -0.685* -2.196 0.058 0.449 0.156* -0.335
(0.115) (0.473) (0.374) (1.576) (0.122) (0.601) (0.092) (0.388)
taxprop2 -0.062 0.321 -0.114 0.065
(0.099) (0.288) (0.120) (0.087)
taxvat 0.097 0.272 -0.783*** -1.862 0.067 -0.124 0.109** -0.033
(0.082) (0.250) (0.294) (1.132) (0.096) (0.357) (0.050) (0.184)
taxvat2 -0.009 0.048 0.008 0.008
(0.013) (0.043) (0.018) (0.009)
gfcfgr 0.302*** 0.295*** 0.181*** 0.182*** 0.347*** 0.327*** 0.282*** 0.275***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.050) (0.050) (0.011) (0.010)
current -0.019 -0.039 -0.098** -0.071 -0.059 -0.089 0.029 0.006
(0.037) (0.042) (0.043) (0.048) (0.049) (0.055) (0.018) (0.018)
ltir 0.007 0.047 -0.269*** -0.258** -0.017 0.027 -0.012 0.039
(0.059) (0.065) (0.104) (0.111) (0.097) (0.113) (0.041) (0.043)
avg 0.000 -0.001 -0.006*** -0.009*** 0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
unem 0.013 0.002 -0.084* -0.084* 0.016 0.006 0.011 0.023
(0.036) (0.039) (0.045) (0.045) (0.043) (0.048) (0.025) (0.025)
capb -0.068 -0.051 0.082 0.042 0.060 0.118 -0.099** -0.091**
(0.065) (0.074) (0.075) (0.071) (0.092) (0.115) (0.040) (0.040)
debt -0.007* -0.006 0.023*** 0.033*** -0.003 -0.005 -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.011) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
totexp -0.103* -0.120* -0.091 -0.085 -0.033 -0.027 -0.135*** -0.163***
(0.057) (0.061) (0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.083) (0.030) (0.030)
Tax thresholds
taxinc - - - - - - - -
taxfirms - 5.57% - - - - - 6.07%
ssc - 10.92% - 17.15% - - - 13.48%
taxpayroll - 1.78% - - - - - 1.93%
taxprop - - - - - - - -
taxvat - - - - - - - -
R2 0.630 0.651 0.834 0.844 0.624 0.641 0.462 0.476
DW-statistic 1.432 1.492 1.518 1.554 1.472 1.507 n.a. n.a.
Obs. 525 525 525 525 491 491 525 525
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Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The robust standard errors are
in brackets. The White diagonal covariance matrix is used in order to assume residual heterokedasticity, with the exception
for RLS technique. The DW-statistic is the Durbin-Watson statistic. The non-bold and bold values express, respectively,
maximum and minimum optimal tax items levels.
Now looking for the equations (9) to (16), which show the results of equation (1) and
(2) by using the second set of control variables as mentioned before, we can conclude that
government spending, by the functions of government, are generally negative to growth as
also evidenced in the previous results. The same negative effect on growth is also found
for life expectancy. In contrast to these results, an increment of monetary supply and
on total factor productivity appears to improve real economic growth. Yet, an increase
of household consumptions presents a negative impact on growth, although the statistical
coefficients obtained evidence a marginal impact (less than 0.15% on economic growth by
an unit increase in household consumption).
When we evaluate possible tax-to-growth thresholds with the second set of control
variables, we verify fewer values. The results show average growth-maximizing values of
13.76% for social security contributions, while evidencing maximum values of 2.50% and
4.58% for taxes on payroll and on property, respectively. Comparing to the previous results,
we conclude that there are no structural differences between the regression results using
the first or the second set of control variables. In these regressions, a tax on goods and
services threshold is found to be 14.52%, on average. The results are presented in table 3.
Table 3: Linear and non-linear short-run impact results of taxation structure on economic
growth dynamics for equation (2).
OLS OLS-FE GMM RLS
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
lngdppc−1 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
taxinc 0.307*** 0.279** 0.177 0.075 -0.002 0.153 0.189*** 0.110
(0.08) (0.136) (0.129) (0.298) (0.114) (0.186) (0.064) (0.117)
taxinc2 0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.005
(0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005)
taxfirms 0.172** 0.304 0.237 0.373 -0.081 -0.693 0.069 0.338
(0.087) (0.265) (0.153) (0.375) (0.138) (0.501) (0.091) (0.267)
taxfirms2 -0.022 -0.014 0.052 -0.031
(0.021) (0.026) (0.043) (0.024)
ssc 0.374*** 0.989*** -0.452* -0.365 0.192 0.592** 0.283*** 0.750***
(0.078) (0.199) (0.241) (0.839) (0.120) (0.273) (0.060) (0.184)
ssc2 -0.035*** -0.004 -0.022 -0.028***
(0.010) (0.031) (0.014) (0.009)
taxpayroll 0.492*** 1.490*** -0.394 0.601 0.136 0.176 0.294* 0.904**
(0.176) (0.451) (0.359) (0.801) (0.205) (0.583) (0.153) (0.440)
taxpayroll2 -0.298** -0.245* 0.036 -0.180
(0.138) (0.138) (0.184) (0.134)
taxprop 0.838*** 1.748*** -0.008 -0.921 1.212*** 1.858 0.523*** 0.734
(0.229) (0.503) (0.185) (0.908) (0.385) (1.331) (0.176) (0.456)
taxprop2 -0.191** 0.112 -0.156 -0.057
(0.074) (0.113) (0.317) (0.081)
taxvat 0.394*** 1.006*** 0.127 1.341* 0.390** 0.436 0.286*** 0.844***
(0.138) (0.383) (0.185) (0.686) (0.197) (0.677) (0.090) (0.321)
taxvat2 -0.027 -0.048* 0.000 -0.028**
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(0.018) (0.028) (0.032) (0.014)
pubser -0.514*** -0.589*** -0.325** -0.369*** -0.417*** -0.490*** -0.464*** -0.489***
(0.085) (0.082) (0.127) (0.138) (0.157) (0.147) (0.068) (0.071)
def -0.271 -0.395* 0.018 0.055 -0.156 -0.189 -0.207 -0.349**
(0.188) (0.211) (0.369) (0.388) (0.254) (0.274) (0.143) (0.157)
pubor -1.083** -1.600*** 0.658 0.693 -1.277* -1.379* -0.638 -1.069**
(0.496) (0.542) (0.828) (0.868) (0.741) (0.792) (0.422) (0.456)
eco -0.186 -0.175 0.015 0.014 -0.601 -0.717 -0.145** -0.109
(0.137) (0.129) (0.058) (0.054) (0.465) (0.515) (0.067) (0.068)
env -1.728*** -1.242* -1.233 -1.171 -1.905** -0.997 -1.842*** -1.303**
(0.646) (0.692) (0.909) (0.942) (0.967) (1.168) (0.470) (0.506)
hou -0.444 -0.574 0.281 0.300 -0.350 -0.085 -0.354 -0.457
(0.433) (0.453) (0.318) (0.331) (0.795) (0.962) (0.274) (0.280)
hea -0.224* -0.177 0.390* 0.401* 0.108 0.142 -0.226** -0.176
(0.125) (0.129) (0.230) (0.230) (0.197) (0.239) (0.105) (0.110)
cul -1.255*** -0.983** 0.016 0.400 -1.084** -1.132* -0.754** -0.491
(0.435) (0.457) (0.693) (0.756) (0.537) (0.637) (0.341) (0.370)
edu -0.281 -0.439** -1.072** -1.126** 0.035 -0.162 -0.227 -0.315*
(0.190) (0.207) (0.441) (0.435) (0.281) (0.399) (0.177) (0.191)
socpro -0.343*** -0.311*** -0.597*** -0.595*** -0.136 -0.086 -0.240*** -0.204***
(0.071) (0.076) (0.144) (0.152) (0.090) (0.119) (0.051) (0.058)
llgdp 0.011** 0.009 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.004 0.008 0.008** 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005)
log(pop) -0.264 -0.267 17.701*** 16.495*** -0.452 -0.624 -0.254 -0.234
(0.217) (0.223) (4.657) (5.217) (0.368) (0.468) (0.155) (0.165)
rtfpna 7.767*** 7.326*** 10.797*** 9.666*** -3.100 -1.415 8.489*** 7.472***
(2.318) (2.305) (2.859) (3.086) (3.415) (3.452) (1.708) (1.818)
ageratioold -0.079 -0.079 0.166* 0.105 -0.184** -0.215** -0.018 -0.014
(0.062) (0.064) (0.098) (0.103) (0.080) (0.089) (0.038) (0.039)
fertility -0.802 -0.743 -7.314*** -6.709*** -3.567*** -3.417*** -0.011 0.391
(0.846) (0.876) (1.419) (1.482) (1.139) (1.252) (0.618) (0.650)
hconsggdp -0.060 -0.051 -0.147* -0.116 -0.090 -0.080 -0.085** -0.070*
(0.043) (0.044) (0.085) (0.088) (0.070) (0.085) (0.035) (0.036)
landarea 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lexpectancy -0.258** -0.288** -0.837*** -0.744** -0.072 -0.032 -0.302*** -0.338***
(0.109) (0.117) (0.316) (0.328) (0.144) (0.163) (0.066) (0.073)
Tax thresholds
taxinc - - - - - - - -
taxfirms - - - - - - - -
ssc - 14.13% - - - - - 13.39%
taxpayroll - 2.50% - - - - - -
taxprop - 4.58% - - - - - -
taxvat - - - 13.97% - - - 15.07%
R-squared 0.392 0.411 0.798 0.801 0.285 0.271 0.305 0.313
Durbin-Watson stat 1.273 1.263 1.195 1.212 1.386 1.403 n.a. n.a.
Obs. 536 536 536 536 500 500 536 536
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The robust standard errors are
in brackets. The White diagonal covariance matrix is used in order to assume residual heterokedasticity, with the exception
for RLS technique. The DW-statistic is the Durbin-Watson statistic. The non-bold and bold values express, respectively,
maximum and minimum optimal tax items levels.
4.2 Long-run effects of taxation on economic growth
In what respects to the long-term relationship between taxation structure and economic
growth, we also compute our main equations using both sets of variables. As explained
variable, we use the 5-years average economic growth rates to evaluate the taxation items
impact in gross income performance. The long-term results are shown in tables 4 and 5,
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for first and second sets of control variables, respectively.
Regarding to the first set of control variables with linear relationships of taxes with
growth (equations (1), (3), (5) and (7)), we verify the same positive impact of investment
growth on economic performance, as in the short-run analysis. The same conclusions are
reached for the impacts of government spending. However, and in accordance to the short-
run results, the government debt growth and fiscal consolidation, through the structural
budget balance, evidence, in general, a negative relation with per capita growth. Yet, the
results show a positive linkage between some tax items and growth, namely, social security
contributions and taxes on payroll. For the remaining tax sources, the results obtained
cannot be summarized in an unique impact of growth, since different signals are obtained,
depending on the econometric specifications.
In the analysis of possible non-linear impacts of taxation on economic performance
(equations (2), (4), (6) and (8)), we retrieve similar conclusions of the control variables
effect on per capita growth. In what concerns the taxation thresholds existence, we obtain
maximum average values of 10.80% and 10.58% for social security contributions and for
taxes on goods and services, respectively. We also reach two optimal average values of
maximum taxation for taxes on payroll and workforce (1.95%), while property taxes appear
to not present a non-linear connection with economic growth.
Table 4: Linear and non-linear long-run impact results of taxation structure on economic
growth dynamics for equation (1).
OLS OLS-FE GMM RLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lngdppc−1 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** 0.000** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
taxinc 0.035 -0.007 -0.203*** -0.302* 0.058 -0.029 0.073*** -0.020
(0.043) (0.072) (0.078) (0.178) (0.062) (0.109) (0.027) (0.052)
taxinc2 0.002 0.003 0.005* 0.004**
(0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002)
taxfirms -0.009 0.113 0.043 0.394*** 0.002 0.458** 0.028 0.180*
(0.041) (0.119) (0.073) (0.148) (0.054) (0.186) (0.037) (0.107)
taxfirms2 -0.017* -0.029*** -0.049*** -0.015
(0.010) (0.009) (0.018) (0.010)
ssc 0.078* 0.385*** -0.170 0.103 0.107 0.497*** 0.142*** 0.373***
(0.041) (0.064) (0.120) (0.498) (0.054) (0.087) (0.022) (0.052)
ssc2 -0.020*** -0.014 -0.024*** -0.015***
(0.003) (0.021) (0.004) (0.003)
taxpayroll 0.023 0.506*** 0.219 0.470 0.091 0.683** 0.115* 0.381**
(0.070) (0.184) (0.151) (0.322) (0.094) (0.265) (0.063) (0.171)
taxpayroll2 -0.141*** -0.082 -0.162** -0.066
(0.048) (0.058) (0.070) (0.051)
taxprop 0.060 0.469 -0.726*** -1.766** -0.026 -0.057 0.196*** 0.445*
(0.076) (0.290) (0.272) (0.846) (0.088) (0.378) (0.057) (0.245)
taxprop2 -0.138** 0.232 -0.042 -0.076
(0.065) (0.142) (0.080) (0.055)
taxvat -0.006 0.499*** -0.406*** -0.852*** 0.018 0.378** 0.060* 0.256**
(0.056) (0.152) (0.119) (0.324) (0.071) (0.181) (0.031) (0.117)
taxvat2 -0.026*** 0.022 -0.018** -0.011*
(0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.006)
gfcfgr 0.044*** 0.040*** 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.094*** 0.079*** 0.023*** 0.021***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.028) (0.026) (0.007) (0.007)
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current 0.024 0.010 -0.027 -0.027 -0.020 -0.033 0.020* 0.000
(0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025) (0.011) (0.012)
ltir -0.006 0.003 -0.091* -0.098* 0.074 0.149* 0.058** 0.080***
(0.045) (0.049) (0.052) (0.054) (0.073) (0.082) (0.025) (0.027)
avg 0.001** 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
unem 0.002 -0.026 -0.110*** -0.104*** 0.005 -0.010 -0.008 -0.026
(0.029) (0.028) (0.036) (0.037) (0.035) (0.037) (0.015) (0.016)
capb -0.084** -0.059 0.073 0.066 -0.075 -0.065 -0.066*** -0.041
(0.037) (0.039) (0.048) (0.047) (0.070) (0.080) (0.025) (0.026)
debt -0.018*** -0.016*** 0.016*** 0.020*** -0.012*** -0.011** -0.015*** -0.015***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
totexp -0.036 -0.037 0.024 0.020 -0.069 -0.091 -0.077*** -0.071***
(0.041) (0.042) (0.048) (0.046) (0.056) (0.061) (0.018) (0.019)
Tax threshold
taxinc - - - - - - - -
taxfirms - - - 6.79% - 4.67% - -
ssc - 9.63% - - - 10.35% - 12.43%
taxpayroll - 1.79% - - - 2.11% - -
taxprop - - - - - - - -
taxvat - 9.60% - - - 10.50% - 11.64%
R-squared 0.390 0.440 0.781 0.788 0.288 0.343 0.338 0.359
Durbin-Watson stat 0.433 0.472 0.804 0.848 0.749 0.770 n.a. n.a.
Obs. 525 525 525 525 491 491 525 525
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The robust standard errors are
in brackets. The White diagonal covariance matrix is used in order to assume residual heterokedasticity, with the exception
for RLS technique. The DW-statistic is the Durbin-Watson statistic. The non-bold and bold values express, respectively,
maximum and minimum optimal tax items levels.
For the regressions in the long run using the second set of control variables, we obtain
the following optimal maximum tax items thresholds values: 7.61% for social security
contributions, 3.08% for taxes on payroll, 3.87% for property taxation and 10.88% for
consumption taxation, both values on average.
Additionally, similar results for the long-run are reached for the control variables im-
pact on real per capita GDP growth, when compared to those obtained in the short-run
regressions. In particular, the public spending by function evidence a negative impact for
economic growth and, consequently, stronger negative affect of expenditures on environ-
ment activities. The monetary supply seems to loose statistical significance when it ex-
plains the long-term growth, while total factor productivity significance remains, although
its impact on real growth is not so high in the long-term. Lastly, household consumption,
fertility rate, old-age dependency ratio and life expectancy present the same conclusions
as in the short-term analysis.
Table 5: Linear and non-linear long-run impact results of taxation structure on economic
growth dynamics for equation (2).
OLS OLS-FE GMM RLS
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
lngdppc−1 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
taxinc -0.042 -0.030 0.108 0.075 -0.033 -0.087 -0.001 -0.008
(0.031) (0.058) (0.068) (0.160) (0.048) (0.085) (0.028) (0.049)
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taxinc2 0.000 -0.001 0.003 -0.001
(0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002)
taxfirms -0.022 0.102 0.169** 0.312* -0.020 0.065 -0.012 -0.095
(0.049) (0.128) (0.072) (0.173) (0.070) (0.200) (0.040) (0.111)
taxfirms2 -0.020** -0.012 -0.014 -0.009
(0.010) (0.012) (0.017) (0.010)
ssc -0.023 0.225*** -0.059 0.471 -0.014 0.324*** 0.048* 0.308***
(0.031) (0.078) (0.115) (0.492) (0.053) (0.106) (0.027) (0.076)
ssc2 -0.016*** -0.023 -0.020*** -0.020***
(0.004) (0.019) (0.005) (0.004)
taxpayroll 0.063 0.138 0.428** 1.047** 0.099 0.484** 0.103 0.028
(0.056) (0.165) (0.193) (0.405) (0.065) (0.234) (0.067) (0.183)
taxpayroll2 -0.024 -0.170** -0.107 0.018
(0.048) (0.076) (0.073) (0.056)
taxprop 0.275*** 0.774*** -0.149 -1.142 0.438** 1.195** 0.251*** 0.988***
(0.094) (0.245) (0.155) (0.697) (0.184) (0.505) (0.078) (0.190)
taxprop2 -0.102*** 0.130 -0.194 -0.125***
(0.039) (0.082) (0.118) (0.034)
taxvat -0.129** 0.470*** 0.089 0.702** -0.064 0.642** -0.011 0.466***
(0.056) (0.161) (0.093) (0.339) (0.071) (0.292) (0.040) (0.133)
taxvat2 -0.027*** -0.024* -0.032** -0.023***
(0.007) (0.014) (0.013) (0.006)
pubser -0.129*** -0.164*** -0.063 -0.111 -0.167** -0.206*** -0.142*** -0.183***
(0.040) (0.039) (0.069) (0.071) (0.076) (0.074) (0.030) (0.030)
def -0.106 -0.127 0.160 0.197 -0.101 -0.199* 0.027 -0.046
(0.080) (0.084) (0.184) (0.198) (0.115) (0.113) (0.063) (0.065)
pubor 0.059 -0.403* -0.089 -0.087 -0.015 -0.487 -0.392** -0.574***
(0.214) (0.207) (0.407) (0.408) (0.288) (0.311) (0.186) (0.189)
eco 0.004 0.012 0.076 0.075 0.117 0.156 -0.059** 0.046
(0.059) (0.054) (0.057) (0.051) (0.270) (0.269) (0.030) (0.028)
env -1.740*** -1.428*** -2.512*** -2.423*** -2.193*** -1.801*** -1.026*** -0.642***
(0.278) (0.286) (0.448) (0.458) (0.504) (0.525) (0.207) (0.210)
hou 0.039 -0.101 0.007 0.039 0.136 -0.227 0.121 0.124
(0.148) (0.164) (0.157) (0.166) (0.472) (0.487) (0.121) (0.117)
hea 0.148** 0.165** 0.152 0.168 0.081 0.110 -0.005 0.135***
(0.062) (0.069) (0.149) (0.166) (0.102) (0.118) (0.046) (0.046)
cul -0.304 -0.087 0.685* 0.946*** -0.409 -0.234 -0.011 -0.350**
(0.238) (0.248) (0.358) (0.356) (0.269) (0.296) (0.150) (0.154)
edu -0.185** -0.216** 0.103 0.046 -0.266** -0.273 -0.121 -0.254***
(0.083) (0.088) (0.199) (0.204) (0.119) (0.169) (0.078) (0.079)
socpro -0.008 0.018 -0.277*** -0.280*** -0.024 -0.012 -0.026 0.048**
(0.028) (0.030) (0.081) (0.083) (0.038) (0.042) (0.022) (0.024)
llgdp 0.001 -0.000 0.007 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
log(pop) -0.223** -0.187* 11.093*** 9.345*** -0.184 -0.103 -0.162** -0.282***
(0.099) (0.108) (2.465) (2.689) (0.174) (0.216) (0.068) (0.069)
rtfpna -0.001 -0.364 4.635*** 3.597** -0.796 -1.320 1.041 0.808
(1.047) (1.076) (1.558) (1.617) (1.322) (1.370) (0.753) (0.756)
ageratioold -0.079*** -0.077*** 0.109** 0.066 -0.078*** -0.073*** -0.076*** -0.113***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.052) (0.055) (0.024) (0.028) (0.017) (0.016)
fertility -0.191 -0.338 -2.388*** -2.184*** -0.264 -0.056 -0.607** -0.538**
(0.334) (0.357) (0.716) (0.758) (0.445) (0.471) (0.273) (0.270)
hconsggdp -0.103*** -0.104*** -0.078* -0.057 -0.105*** -0.094** -0.053*** -0.084***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.044) (0.045) (0.037) (0.038) (0.016) (0.015)
landarea -0.000** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lexpectancy -0.244*** -0.280*** -0.251 -0.205 -0.220*** -0.269*** -0.215*** -0.226***
(0.033) (0.036) (0.189) (0.193) (0.041) (0.050) (0.029) (0.030)
Tax thresholds
taxinc - - - - - - - -
taxfirms - - - - - - - -
ssc - 7.03% - - - 8.10% - 7.70%
taxpayroll - - - 3.08% - - - -
taxprop - 3.79% - - - - - 3.95%
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taxvat - 8.72% - 25.07% - 10.03% - 10.13%
R-squared 0.636 0.662 0.796 0.803 0.631 0.649 0.475 0.509
Durbin-Watson stat 0.537 0.570 0.808 0.839 0.545 0.598 n.a. n.a.
Obs. 536 536 536 536 500 500 536 536
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The robust standard errors are
in brackets. The White diagonal covariance matrix is used in order to assume residual heterokedasticity, with the exception
for RLS technique. The DW-statistic is the Durbin-Watson statistic. The non-bold and bold values express, respectively,
maximum and minimum optimal tax items levels.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this analysis, we have evaluated the relationship between the tax structure in pro-
portion of GDP and real per capita economic growth. This study was conducted in both
short-term and a long-term basis, and tried to assess possible non-linear relationships be-
tween taxation and growth. The analyses conducted for all OECD countries between 1980
and 2015 resorts to two set of control variables, in order to understand the tax structure
impacts on GDP growth.
The results reached in this study evidence the tax-to-GDP thresholds idea, which trans-
lates into optimal maximum values for some tax items, in proportion of GDP. In particular,
and only in a short-term basis, we found optimal maximum values for taxes on firms, while
the social security contributions, taxes on payroll and workforce, taxes on property and
taxes on consumption present threshold values for both short and long-term. Furthermore,
we conclude that there are no optimal threshold values for taxation of individual incomes.
Lastly, and by comparing our results with the mean values of each tax item presented
in the summary statistics, we verify that the historic mean value for consumption taxes is
coincident with the threshold value registered for that tax source in the end. In addition,
we verify that there is a fiscal space to raise some tax revenues, in GDP proportion, by
confronting the obtained threshold results with average historic values. This will lead to a
raise in government revenues without jeopardizing the economic performance. This is valid
for taxes on firms, for social security contributions (this last is only valid except for the
second econometric specification in a long-run analysis), taxes on payroll and workforce,
and property taxes.
Furthermore, an additional hypothetical exercise can be made: if we sum the thresholds
finding values with the average mean of the other tax components that do not display
threshold values, we conclude that the proportion of taxation levied on GDP should be
between 40.20% and 46.99%, in a short-term perspective, and between 37.07% and 39.63%,
in a long-run framework, depending on the results obtained for the first and second set of
control variables used in our analysis. Taking into account this exercise and the mean values
for total revenues (32.95%, based on OECD data), we can conclude that, on average, there
was fiscal space to increase tax-to-GDP ratio and, consequently, to increase both short
and long-run real per capita economic growth. The table 6 summarizes our main findings
regarding average tax threshold values.
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Table 6: Summary of tax items threshold values for per capita real GDP growth rate.
(1) (2)
Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run Mean
taxinc - - - - 8.82%
taxfirms 5.82% 5.73% - - 2.81%
ssc 17.15% / 11.37% 10.80% 13.76% 7.61% 8.35%
taxpayroll 1.86% 1.95% 2.50% 3.08% 0.37%
taxprop - - 4.58% 3.87% 1.75%
taxvat - 10.58% 14.52% 10.88% 10.59%
Notes: The non-bold and bold values, presented in the short-run and long-run columns express maximum and minimum
optimum levels, respectively. The values expressed in italics represent average values.
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